A holiday reading list from The Claremont Institute. As an added bonus, the man contributed. Consider it a little update to the comps reading list, if that doesn't cause too many nightmares.
They did forget Derek's book though, which is a mistake, because I just finished Freedom's Main Line a few weeks ago, and it really is a wonderful read about a remarkable story. I only have two critiques of the book, and they are minor. First, DC's a little hard on Eisenhower for my taste, which is not a major part of the book by any means and takes nothing away from the central story. Still, Ike killed waaay more Naatzis than Brad Pitt, so dammit that should count for something even in a book about an entirely different subject. Second, I'm a knuckle dragger and the imagery of the Freedom Rides were so important that the book really could have used some more pictures. I know the difficulty Derek ran into on this issue, and I could look online or at the Taylor Branch book to get the pictures, so I recommend that all you other readers out there do the same.
Seriously, Derek's book is really good. Buy it, read it, buy another copy or two for friends and family, etc.
On another note, I'll forgive the folks at Claremont for leaving A Nation Forged in War off the list, since no one has read it yet. (Yes, I know, it's getting obnoxious. This is just the beginning.)
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
Monday, December 07, 2009
Tuesday, December 01, 2009
The Book Cover
Here tis:
We seem to be pretty well on track for it to be out in March or April. I'm told the list price will be $39.95, although I am fairly certain there will be a discount through the online retailers like Amazon that will put it in the lower $30s, which is not too bad for a hardcover. You know, just in case you are planning to use it in the classroom....
More to follow.
We seem to be pretty well on track for it to be out in March or April. I'm told the list price will be $39.95, although I am fairly certain there will be a discount through the online retailers like Amazon that will put it in the lower $30s, which is not too bad for a hardcover. You know, just in case you are planning to use it in the classroom....
More to follow.
Clausewitz Review
I reviewed Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, for the upcoming Joint Force Quarterly.
Take a look.
Take a look.
Monday, November 30, 2009
Coulda, Shoulda
Our friend Derek Catsam asks what I think of this article (drawn from a book) by historian David Colley critiquing a decision by General Eisenhower. Read Derek's post and Colley's article and come back.
Done? Okay. Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Wash D.C.: CMH, 1993) is the official history volume that covers these events. Chapter 24 is called "Lost Opportunities," and it includes a section called "A Dubious Decision," so Colley isn't exactly bucking conventional wisdom. If anything, Colley would be more of a revisionist if he gave Ike credit for the decision.
But here's the thing, most military historians and analysts favor maneuver--the more dramatic the better. What they often miss is that dramatic maneuvers in broad front wars can be effective but are often extremely costly. In that sense, it is misleading to state that the casualties of the Battle of the Bulge could have been preempted by a November 1944 attack by 6th Army Group across the Rhine. Such an attack would have created a salient with extended frontage that would have to be defended. The German units that fought in the Bulge would have to be defeated somewhere, and it is not clear by any means that fighting them (and others) along an extended bridgehead over the upper Rhine would have been less costly, especially considering the terrible weather of that winter. The inevitable German counterattacks probably would have caused similar casualties to the Bulge.
(The area at issue is in the bottom right corner. Click on the map for a larger image.)
There are specific issues to the decision too, such as Eisenhower having to pull resources from his main coalition ally in Montgomery to support the crossing, or the fact that Eisenhower thought with good reason that Patton was his most effective operational commander and should thus lead the main effort in the region, or that Devers's Army Group had a large salient known as the Colmar Pocket on his right flank and the largely French forces tasked with reducing the pocket took until February to finish the task, or that Omar Bradley (whose opinion should count) also opposed the early crossing.
Yes, fortune favors the bold, but Eisenhower was not depending on fortune to win, he was depending on well-thought-out American military strategic and operational concepts that sought to confront and destroy the enemy directly without taking undue losses. That meant, mong other things, not overextending fronts or lines of supply through dramatic maneuvers unless the enemy was in complete collapse (as happened in the late summer of 1944). I'm not saying Eisenhower was right--maybe Devers could have ended the war sooner and with fewer casualties--but to say that the correct decision was obvious and that Ike was driven only by personal animosity is the worst kind of Monday morning quarterbacking, and certainly not my favorite use of military history.
Done? Okay. Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Wash D.C.: CMH, 1993) is the official history volume that covers these events. Chapter 24 is called "Lost Opportunities," and it includes a section called "A Dubious Decision," so Colley isn't exactly bucking conventional wisdom. If anything, Colley would be more of a revisionist if he gave Ike credit for the decision.
But here's the thing, most military historians and analysts favor maneuver--the more dramatic the better. What they often miss is that dramatic maneuvers in broad front wars can be effective but are often extremely costly. In that sense, it is misleading to state that the casualties of the Battle of the Bulge could have been preempted by a November 1944 attack by 6th Army Group across the Rhine. Such an attack would have created a salient with extended frontage that would have to be defended. The German units that fought in the Bulge would have to be defeated somewhere, and it is not clear by any means that fighting them (and others) along an extended bridgehead over the upper Rhine would have been less costly, especially considering the terrible weather of that winter. The inevitable German counterattacks probably would have caused similar casualties to the Bulge.
(The area at issue is in the bottom right corner. Click on the map for a larger image.)
There are specific issues to the decision too, such as Eisenhower having to pull resources from his main coalition ally in Montgomery to support the crossing, or the fact that Eisenhower thought with good reason that Patton was his most effective operational commander and should thus lead the main effort in the region, or that Devers's Army Group had a large salient known as the Colmar Pocket on his right flank and the largely French forces tasked with reducing the pocket took until February to finish the task, or that Omar Bradley (whose opinion should count) also opposed the early crossing.
Yes, fortune favors the bold, but Eisenhower was not depending on fortune to win, he was depending on well-thought-out American military strategic and operational concepts that sought to confront and destroy the enemy directly without taking undue losses. That meant, mong other things, not overextending fronts or lines of supply through dramatic maneuvers unless the enemy was in complete collapse (as happened in the late summer of 1944). I'm not saying Eisenhower was right--maybe Devers could have ended the war sooner and with fewer casualties--but to say that the correct decision was obvious and that Ike was driven only by personal animosity is the worst kind of Monday morning quarterbacking, and certainly not my favorite use of military history.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Modern Art
I love this kind of thing on the internet. Someone saw a stupid shirt for sale on Amazon and wrote a funny review. Then a bunch of people did the same thing. Now this shirt (and reviewing it) has taken on a life of its own. I now present:
Amazon.com: The Mountain Men's Three Wolf Moon Short Sleeve Tee: Clothing
Amazon.com: The Mountain Men's Three Wolf Moon Short Sleeve Tee: Clothing
Friday, November 13, 2009
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
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